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Stalemate and Apathy in Poland
By

DAVID

S.

MASON

AssociaU Professor of Polili£al Seima, BUll" UnivtTSiO'
OR Polish society, the last five years have been, in
tum, exhilarating, chaotic and depressing. I The
dockworkers' and miners' strikes ofAugust, 1980,
forced the government to sign the Gdansk Agreements,
the first of which allowed the formation of the indepen
d~nt self-governing trade union Solidarity. During the 16
months of Solidarity's legal existence, Poland had the
most democratic environment in its postwar history.
General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Poland's Prime Minister
and party leader, brought this to an end with the declara
tion of martial law on December 13, 1981. Martial law
was formally lifted in july, 1983, and most ofthe interned
Solidarity leaders were released in july, 1984. But many
martial law restrictions were continued, and Poland re
mains a society that is sullen, pessimistic and divided.
Solidarity'S impact on Poland was remarkable. The
union attracted some nine million members-one-third
ofPoland's adult population. The universal appeal ofthis
independent, free-spirited organization extended into the
Polish United Workers party (Poland's Communist par
ty), one-third of whose members joined Solidarity. The
openness of political debate in Solidarity forced a demo
cratization ofvirtually every other institution in the coun
try, including the party. The flood of independent pub
lications issued by Solidarity groups opened the official
press and led to the implementatiol: of a new and vastly
more liberal law on censorship. Solidarity'S popularity,
its programs, and its charismatic leader. tech Walesa,
forced the party and the government to cc.mpetl: for the
people's allegiance.
Thus, during 1981, the regime conceded a number of
popular issues: legalizing Solidarity and its right to strike;
allowing the Sunday radio broadcast of Roman Catholic
mass; granting work-free Saturdays and dramatic in
creases in wages; and permitting Solidarity to publish its
own national weekly newspaper, Tygodnik SolidaT7WSC.
New legislation provided greater autonomy for universi
ties, decentralized economic refonn, and established a
system ofenterprise self-management in which the work-
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IThe author would like to thank Robert Sharlet and David
Ost for their helpful comments "nd suggestions on this article.
'For an excellent account ofthe Solidarity experience and the
early months of martial law, see Timothy Garton Ash, 17It
Polish RnJolution: SoIid4rig (New York: Scribner'., 1984).

ers would share in the governance of the workplace and
select its director.
There was, however, a dark side to these concessions.
The relationship between Solidarity and the regime was
bitter, distrustful and conflict-prone; neither side ad·
justed to the compromise necessary for democracy. Soli
darity accused the government ofreneging on the Gdansk
Agreements (it remains a popular myth in Poland that
the government never implemented any of the 21 de
mands). Not trusting the government to accede to its
demands through negotiation, Solidarity often resorted to
the only tactic that had brought results: strikes, or the
threat of strikes.
The regime, on the other hand, claimed that Solidarity
had exceeded the boundaries set in August, 1980, making
demands that were more political than economic and
threatening the constitutional principle of the "leading
role of the party." To complicate matters further, the
Polish economy continued the nose dive that began in
1979, ca using serious shortages of basic products like
bn:ad. All this contributed to the crisis atmosphere oflate
19t31. When jaruzelski declared a "state of war" (there
was no provision in the Polish constitution for martial
law), he claimed that he did so in sorrow; Poland was "on
the edge of the abyss" and his action was necessary to
save the country from civil war and chaos. 2
The speed and effectiveness of the crackdown were
extraordinary. Several thousand Solidarity leaders and
activists were "interned" and others went into hiding.
The flood ofSolidarity publications, banners, posters and
buttons disappeared, declared illegal by the military au
thorities. All organizations, demonstrations and assem
blies (except religious ones) were temporarily banned.
The regime imposed a curfew, put restrictions on travel,
and blacked out communications. The spontaneous
strikes and demonstrations launched by workers and
miners were starved out or broken up, often violently, by
"lOMO," the motorized riot police.
jaruzelski's professed task during this period was "nor
malization" with the promise of a continuation of the
process of"renewal" begun in 1981. The apparent stabi
lization led the regime graduaUy to relax the restrictions
of martial law, while formaUy eliminating the new and
reformed institutions and weakening the laws that
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emerged in 1981. In October, 1982, Solidarity was for
mally banned, with a law providing for the establishment
of new unions. In November, Walesa was released from
internment and allowed to return to work in the Gdansk
shipyards. In July, 1983, martial law was lifted, though
many of its restrictions remained in force. InJuly, 1983,
and inJuly, 1984, the regime proclaimed an amnesty for
Solidarity activists under arrest or in hiding.
While the regime may claim some success with "nor
malization" in the two years since the lifting of martial
law, and while it may claim to be on the road to economic
recovery and political renewal, in reality the situation is
less rosy and more complex. Popular defiance and open
resistance may not be so prevalent as they were two years
ago, but the regime has not been able to achieve the
legitimacy it desires, nor has it mobilized the population
toward its economic and political goals.
THE REGIME'S EFFORTS AT "NORMALIZAll0N"

When martial law was lifted, Prime MinisterJaruzel
ski told the Sejm (the Polish Parliament):
Our intentions are sincere. They are demonstrated by the
implementation ofsocialist renewal. They are confirmed by
the democratization or social life, the strengthening of the
position of the working class, the rebirth of the trade union
movement, the development of the class-based, indepen
dent and self-governing trade unions, by the consolidation
of the practice of seeking advice and consultation, and by
the far· reaching economic reform.
At the same time, he asserted that "anarchy will not
return to Poland. Efforts to undertake antistate activity
will be repressed no less resolutely than during martial
law.,,3 These words exemplify the two-track policy the
regime has followed: efforts to elicit controlled participa
tion, advice and support, and forceful suppression of
dissent and underground activity. Neither track has been
entirely successful.
In its effort to channel and control the participatory
spirit bred by Solidarity, the regime has dissolved most of
the old institutional structures and has created new ones
under the party's supervision. As might be expected,
none of these has generated the enthusiasm or participa
tion that Solidarity enjoyed. The regime-sponsored Patri
otic Committee for National Rebirth (PRON), estab
lished inJuly, 1982, was to act as a coalition of all social
forces, but it has attracted little interest or support. It is
widely and openly criticized for not reflecting public
needs. +
New regime-sponsored organizations for artists, writ
3Wojciechjaruzelski, PT{OTlOWimia /983 (Warsaw: Ksiazka i
Wiedza, 1984), pp. 167-168.
·See, for example, the roundtable discussion titled "An At
tempt at Dialogue," in Polivk4,january 5,1985; translated in
joint Publications Research Service, East Eruopt Report, no.
85/27 (February 28, 1985).
~Try6uNJ Wu, April 27, 1984.
6For the draft of the new legislation, see "Ustawa 0 zwiaz
leach zawodowych," Zwi~wi«. May, 1985.

ers,journalists and students have bttn unable to recruit
as many members as their more independent predeces
sors. The new Polish Students' Association, for example,
has enrolled only about 10 percent of all students. These
new organizations find it difficult to attract members
partly because of a continuing Solidarity-sponsored boy
cott of all "official" organizations.
The regime's main hope seems to lie with the reconsti
tuted trade unions. These organizations, as defined by the
law of October, 1982, were to be "independent" and
"self-governing" (terms used to describe Solidarity) and
were to have the right to strike, which pre-Solidarity
unions had not had. But they are limited by a number of
restrictions. At first, they could exist only at the factory
level, not at the regional or nationallevelsj when they did
expand, "they were organized by branch of industry,
rather than region, as Solidarity had bttn; and, most
critically, there was only one union organization in each
enterprise until 1985, though this restriction has been
repeatedly extended.
Despite a Solidarity boycott, the new unions now num
ber about five million members, considerably fewer than
the Solidarity or the pre-1980 union members but prob
ably more than either Solidarity or the regime expected.
In fact, a number ofsurveys show that about one-third of
the new members are former members of Solidarity.
Most workers, however, have adopted a "wait and see"
attitude toward the new unions, and so far they have not
seen very much. The new unions have been short on both
resources and legitimacy, and they have bttn visible
mostly in complaints about price increases. In the spring
of 1984, national union officials publicly complained that
government decisions on price increases had bttn taken
"without any consultation with the trade unions.,,5 In
1985, the government actually scaled down price in
creases, ostensibly in response to union complaints.
To boost the visibility and attractiveness of the new
unions and to create central organizations with which the
government could "consult," the government allowed
accelerated development of national union structures,
culminating in the establishment of a centralized Trade
Unions' National Agreement (OPZZ) in November,
1984. And in July, 1985, the Sejm passed an updated
trade union law that strengthened the factory-level
unions by granting them responsibility for all employees
(not just union members) and extending their responsi
bilities, especially in the area ofsocial welfare. 6 While this
may have been helpful for the new unions, it struck a .
double blow at Solidarity: the new legislation extends the
ban on multiple unions in a workplace, frustrating Soli
darity's demands for trade union pluralism, and it trans
fers to the unions some of the functions held by enterprise
self-management councils, where many Solidarity sup
porters had directed their support.
In many ways, the trade union issue illustrates the
wider dilemmas and paradoxes of post-martial law Po
land. A strong and vocal minority, including the most
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active Solidarity supporters, refuses to support the new
structures and brands those who do as collaborators or
opportunists. On the other hand, many Poles believe that
the unions provide the only real opportunity to defend the
interests of the workers, given domestic and "geopoliti
cal" realities. 7 A broad middle group refuses to identifY
with either position, preferring to "wait and see" or sim
ply to tum away from public and societal affairs
altogether. This roughly equal tripartite division has par
alyzed Polish society, making it impossible for either the
regime or the opposition to muster enough support to
carry through its programs.
The regime has used other methods to pursue "nor
malization," but these too have had mixed results. In
June, 1984, the government staged elections to the local
and regional people's councils. There were two candi
dates for each position, and voters could reject the first in
favor of the second candidate. Solidarity's underground
Interim Coordinating Committee (TKK) called for a
boycott of the elections and arranged for Solidarity sup
porters to monitor polling places for an accurate reading
of the turnout.
The final results allowed both sides to claim a victory.
The government claimed a 75 percent turnout which, in
government spokesman Jerzy Urban's words, showed
"that the public supports stabilization, peace and social
ist development in Poland."s Solidarity said the govern
ment's figures were inflated by between 12 and 15 per
cent, meaning that some 10.5 million people boycotted
the e1ections-a victory for the banned union.
In an effort to portray an atmosphere of stability and
nonnalization and to assuage Western governments, the
government proclaimed major amnesty programs on the
official national holiday ofJuly 22 in both 1983 and 1984.
The 1983 amnesty was broader, covering "almost 3,700
people guilty of political offenses, and over 1,100 who
turned themselves in of their own accord,"9 but it did not
include the most important opposition leaders. The 1984
amnesty did. According to official figures, of652 political
prisoners, 630 were freed; included were 7 members of
Solidarity's National Commission and 4 prominent
members of KOR, the Workers' Defense· Committee.
Since the amnesty, some ofthese people have been arrest
ed again; nevertheless, the amnesty presented a paradoxi
cal situation: an authoritarian Communist state freeing
its most prominent opponents.
7This is the Aesopian term used in both the official and
unofficial press to describe the constraints on Polish action
im~sed by the Soviet Union.
IktcqJospolilll, June 18, 1984.
9qrie WllTs{awy, July 24, 1984.
IOFor example, Lawrence Weschler, "Poland: Three Years
After," HllTpers, December, 1984, p. 18. and Marian Kostecki
and Knysztof Mrda, "Collective Solidarity in Poland's Pow
dered Society," 1h Insurgent Sociologist, vol. 12, nos. 1-2 (1984).
IISolidarity poll reported in Stowo POtkinnne, May 27, 1984;
cited in Radio Free Europe Research (hereafter RFER), "Pol
ish Situation Report,"January 23, J985. Official polJ in Potit".
.la, July 27, 1985, p. 6.

This is not to say that theJaruzelski regime has relied
only on the carrot. The authorities have periodically
cracked down on those who strike, demonstrate, publish
illegally, or plan these activities. On February 13, 1985,
police broke up a Gdansk meeting ofopposition activists
organized by Lech Walesa. Walesa was subsequently
ordered not to leave Gdansk without prior pennission
from the police. Three of his colleagues, Wladyslaw
Frasyniuk, Bogdan Lis, and Adam Michnik, were arrest
ed and tried for planning a strike (which never took
place), and each was sentenced to two to three years
imprisonment.
The authorities have also attempted to rein in the
country's intellectuals and the universities which, even
under martial law, had been among the most outspoken
and autonomous in East Europe. In April, 1985, for
example, history professor and Solidarity adviser Bronis
law Geremek was dismissed from the prestigious Acad
emy of Sciences apparently for public lectures critical of
the Polish government and its relationship to the Soviet
Union. The universities have also been subject to in
creased pressure. In July, 1985, the Sejm passed a new
law on higher education restricting the autonomy of the
universities, over the objections of the the university sen
ate and a number of government advisory commissions.
THE PULVERIZED SOCIETY
In the short term, the regime probably does not need
to worry about another round of insurgency. After the
excitement and disruptions of 1980 and 1981, the depres
sion of 1982, and the economic hardships of the last five
years, many Poles are apathetic and withdrawn from
public life. The apathy and hopelessness are heightened
by the loss of the sense of "solidarity" that characterized
the early months after the Gdansk strikes. While most
Poles objected to martial law, some did support it and
only a minority of the population now backs the protest
activities of the Solidarity underground.
Most Solidarity supporters and many writers 10 suggest
that the regime has deliberately promoted this sense of
hopelessness and division in Polish society because it is
the best protection against rebellion. Whether or not this
is true, apathy and privatism are typical of societies that
have just been through great upheavals; people tum to
personal and family matters for a sense ofreliefand calm.
The sense ofdespair is as much a result ofeconomic as
political factors. Both official and underground public
opinion polls show that the overwhelming majority of
Poles think that the government's policies will not end the
economic crisis and that the economy will deteriorate
even further. t I Other polls show that while almost every
one blames the party and government for the "current
crisis," many also blame "the political opposition." In
fact, both public opinion polls and conversations with
Poles reveal that the only institution in Poland with
widespread support is the Church. Even among Solidar
ity activists, "the underground opposition" is rated favor
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ably by a bare majority (54.6 percent) of the respondents,
while the Church is at the top of the list with 74.5
percent. 17 As usual in these polls, the Polish United
Workers' party is at or near the bottom of these lists, and
other official institutions fare almost as badly.
Frustration, apathy and alienation are particularly evi
dent among the young, who constitute about half the
population and who were the driving force behind Soli
darity. A report by the Primate's Social Council on the
Situation of Young People found "an overwhelming and
increasing passivity on the part of most young people
who, tonnented by futile anger, tum away from the
pressure of schools and organizations and seek refuge in
individualism and in the passivity and exclusiveness of
small groups of friends."13 This report also noted the
increased incidence of religious belief among young pe0
ple and the increasing support for the Church as both a
moral and a political authority.
Even official publications admit that young people
have little confidence in "new sociopolitical institutions,"
do not participate in officially sponsored organizations,
and "distance themselves verbally from the socialist sys
tem and question its achievements."14 A survey of
Gdansk high school students in 1984 found only 2 percent
declaring themselves Marxists; and support is not much
higher among university students. 15 Only II percent of
Polish United Workers' party members are less than 30
years old, the lowest percentage in the party's history.
The party also suffers from a steady decline in mem
bership (from 3.1 million in 1980 to only 2.1 million in
mid-1985).
.
There are grimmer aspects to Polish society. According
to official sources, alcoholism, drug abuse and crime
(including violent crime) are on the increase, and the
visitor to Poland is struck by the number of drunks and
drug addicts encountered in the streets, many of them
young people. This and the attendant alienation and
frustration have led two Polish sociologists to describe
their country as "a pulverized society."16

THE UNDERGROUND
Underground activity remains widespread in Poland,
but Solidarity activists have almost the same difficulty as
the regime in penetrating the pervasive apathy and pas
sivity. As one underground publication argues, "society is
not with us, nor is it with the authorities-it is keeping to
12Slowo POdJ:.iemM, op. cit.
13Cited in RfER, February 15, 1985.
IfGlos S~c~tdllSki,July 2, 1984.
upolitylci1, August 11, 1984. In the 1970's, similar surveys in
different cities found 10 percent or more ofyoung people iden
tifying themselves as Marxists.
16Kostecki and Mrela, op. cit., p. 135.
17 Mysli NtinttmowaM, January-February 1984; translated in
RfER, "Polish Samizdat Excerpts," July 6, 1984. Italics in
original.
'8See his article in the leading underground weekly Tygodnik
Ma~ows~t, March 22, 1984; translated in RFER, "Polish
Samizdal Excerpts," September 7, 1984.

it.self."·7 There are probably tens of thousands of people
involved in various kinds of underground activity, but
most of this is local and decentralized. The "underground
society" penneates the country, but it is not controlled by
the persecuted and divided Solidarity leadership.
In the early months of martial law, the underground
TKK was able to organize major national demonstra
tions against the government. But harassment by the
police and ZOMO and the fatigue ofSolidarity support
ers eventually cut down the size of these demonstrations.
Of the seven initial members of the TKK, all but Zbig
niew Bujak have either surrendered or have been appre
hended (although each of them has been replaced by
someone else on the TKK). The July, 1984, amnesty
added to the ranks of the "above-ground" Solidarity
leadership, fonnally led by Lech Walesa. While most
Solidarity leaders have apparently met with Walesa on
an individual basis, there have been few group meetings.
A meeting was held in September, 1984, atJasna Gora
Monastery in Czestochowa, but another meeting in
February, 1985, was broken up by police and led to long
prison terms for three of the participants. The authorities
continue to harass Walesa and restrict his movements,
and refer to him as a "private person" and "the fonner
leader of a fonner trade union."
Walesa nevertheless remains a popular figure in Po*
land, his reputation enhanced by the 1983 Nobel Peace
Prize. He continues to make cautious statements to West
ern reporters and the underground press about the future
ofthe movement and the country. He has argued in favor
of carving out "relatively independent fields" of activity,
including participation in the employees self-manage
ment councils in enterprises. IS In fact, self-management
has become the major focus for the national Solidarity
leaders, who contend that the self-management councils,
with sufficient participation from Solidarity supporters,
can effect positive changes. Partly because ofSolidarity'S
increasing interest, the regime has tried to fortify the new
trade unions, which often compete with the self-manage
ment bodies in the workplace.
Most large enterprises have underground Solidarity
structures to which, on average, one-fifth ofthe work force
continues to pay monthly dues. Local Solidarity activities
focus on providing financial aid to those persecuted by the
authorities and the printing and distribution ofSolidarity
bulletins and other underground publications. This
samidat has reached unprecedented dimensions, with as
many as 2,000 regular publications. Some of these are
simply 1- or 2-page bulletins (some of which are printed
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in tens of thousano; of copies), but illegal publishers also
produce 5OO-page books and, more recently, they have
begun a line ofcontraband videotapes for the burgeoning
VCR (videocassette recorder) market. 19
This "second economy" in the mass media is an impor
tant source ofinformation for Poles. Moreover, the official
media, in competition with the unofficial, is forced to be
more open and interesting and to address controversial
issues. The result is that Poland, despite censorship, has
the liveliest press in the Soviet bloc.
THECHURCH

While popular support for the Solidarity underground
has diminished, the popularity of the Roman Catholic
Church has grown. According to both official and unoffi
19See Teresa Hanicka, "Underground Publications in Po
land," RFER, "Background Report," July 26, 1984.
2OFor details and analysis of the Popieluszko affair, secJane
Cave, "The Murder ofFather Popieluszko," Po/aruJ Watch, no. 7
(1985), and David Ost, "Now Solidarity Has a Martyr," 1M
Nation, March 2, 1985, pp. 237-240.

.

cia! public opinion polls, it is the most trusted and popu
lar institution in the country. The Church hierarchy, and
particularly Archbishop JozefGlemp, the Primate of Po
land, have lost some favor with staunch Solidarity sup
porters, who often complain of the Church's lack ofdirect
support for the underground movement. But for most
Poles, the Church is the main moral and political repre
sentative of the people, and perhaps the main outlet for
creative and autonomous activity.
Since the imposition of martial law, Glemp has pur
sued a low-key and conciliatory policy, attempting, above
all, to prevent societal or regime violence and to maintain
and enlarge the Church's sphere of autonomy and activ
ity. Until 1984, this strategy seemed to work, with rela
tively good relations between Church and state. TheJoint
Government-Episcopal Commission met regularly, and
progress was reported on a number ofkey Church issues:
the formalization of the legal status of the Church; the
granting of permits to build new churches; and the de
velopment of the Church-sponsored agricultural fund,
which is to raise funds abroad for the development of
private agriculture in Poland. There were points of ten
sion, for example, over the attempts by local authorities to
remove crucifixes from school classrooms, but these con
flicts were usually settled through compromise.
A turning point came in October, 1984, with the ab
duction and murder of the outspoken pro-Solidarity
priest, Father Jerzy Popieluszko, by four officers of the
security police. Popieluszko's funeral on November 3,
presided over by Archbishop Glemp, attracted some
250,000 mourners.
TheJaruzeiski government, at first apparently uncer
tain how to handle the situation, finally decided to allow a
fOrmal investigation ofthe incident. On December 27, the
trial of the four security officers began in the city of
Torun. 20 The trial was yet another Polish paradox: the
Polish state was publicly trying members of its own inter
nal security forces. The trial lasted more than a month,
and was covered extensively by the mass media, includ
ing Polish television. During the trial, the chief govern
ment prosecutor frequently referred to Popieluszko's "ex
tremism" as a cause of his death. Nevertheless, on Febru
ary 7, 1985, all four officers were sentenced to prison
terms ranging from 14 to 25 years.
The murder and the trial had a number of important
consequences. First, it gave Poland a universal martyr.
"Father Jerzy" symbolized the conflict between the
Church and the Polish state, the unity of the Church and
Polish society and, for many, the irreconcilability of the
Catholic society and the Communist regime. Buttons,
pictures and postcards of Popieluszko are in churches
everywhere, and his church and burial site, Saint Stanis
law Kostka in Warsaw, has become a virtual shrine, with
a constant stream of visitors and pilgrims.
The murder and trial also soured relations between the
Church and the state. The trial led the Polish Episcopate
to me a formal complaint against Polish radio and televi
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sion for manipulating trial information in an attempt to
discredit the Church. But media attacks on the Church
have continued, including an unprecedented attack on
the Pope himself. 21 In June, 1985, two priests were con
victed after a one-day trial for "organizing and leading an
illegal protest" over the removal of crosses from class
rooms in the town of Wloszczowa. 22 Shortly thereafter,
Jaruzelski and Glemp met for the first time sinceJanuary,
1984, but the joint communique following the meeting
suggested little progress in church-state relations.

TJiE ECONOMY
The regime claims that the major problem facing
Poland is economic, not political, and many Poles agree.
After four straight years of economic decline (1979
1982), the economy has finally begun to grow again;
national income rose about 6 percent in both 1983 and
1984. Still, national income has not yet recovered to 1978
levels, and in some areas (e.g., livestock) production is
less than it was in the 1960's. Poles have suffered through
six years of shortages, rationing, queuing and inflation.
The cost of living increased 357 percent from 1980 to
1984, and three rounds of price increases in 1985 are
expected to add another 3 percent over 1984. 23 In the
past, food price increases have been met with strikes and
demonstrations, but the recent increases have elicited
little public response. Many Poles rely on the enormous
"second economy" to satisfy household needs; for exam
ple, obtaining scarce medicines through friends who work
in a hospital;. purchasing meat (which is still rationed)
from the "veal lady" who brings it door-to-door from the
countryside; buying clothes in the unofficial but legal
markets in almost any big city.
Poland faces a host of other economic problems: low
levels of productivity, declining quality in manufactured
goods, an outdated capital stock, a huge international
debt, and economic sanctions and credit restrictions from
the West. The debt has continued to grow and now
amounts to $26.8 billion to Western countries and 4.8
billion rubles to socialist countries. Partly because of
Western sanctions, Poland has reoriented its trade to
ward the socialist bloc, making it that much more difficult
to earn the hard currency necessary to repay the Western
debts. The credit crunch may be easing somewhat,
however; most United States sanctions were lifted in
response to the July, 1984, amnesty, and Poland's 17
Western creditor countries (the "Paris Club") agreed in
July, 1985, to reschedule much of Poland's debt repay
ment.
These problems have complicated the regime's efforts
to implement economic reform. Developed during 1981,
21 Politylca, March 3D, 1985.
22RFER, "Polish Situation Report.," June 26, 1985.
23Maly RocQIik Sla!>,s~QlJ /985 (Warsaw: Glowny Urzad
Statystyczny, 1985).
24gee Stanislaw Gomulka and Jacek Rostowski, "The Re
formed Polish Economic System," Sovitt Sbulin, vol. 36 (1984),

pp.386-405.

the reform plan is similar to the Hungarian New Eco
nomic Mechanism; it allows a greater role for the market
and increased autonomy for enterprises, and it sharply
reduces central controls and planning. 24 The political
restrictions of martial law and the economic crisis have
restricted the reform plan; most Polish economists admit
the lack ofpositive results so far. The economic problem is
compounded by the political one; the decentralizing re
form depends on cooperation and hard work from a labor
force that is sullen and withdrawn.
Nevertheless, the 1983 and 1984 increases in national
income and gross industrial output are signs of an eco
nomic recovery. Nineteen eighty-four set a record for
hard coal exports, an important source of foreign ex
change for Poland. The agricultural harvests have been
good for the last three years because of both favorable
weather and a greatly increased share of government
investment in private farms.

CONCLUSIONS
The Jaruzelski regime claims to have achieved a de
gree of stability and "normalization" since 1981, but it
has not been able to achieve political legitimacy. The
issues of democracy, political participation, and justice
raised by Solidarity have not been resolved and continue
to haunt the government. At the same time, Solidarity is
unable to mount protests large enough to threaten the
regime or force it to be more accommodating.
While Solidarity has been driven underground, its spir
it lives on; the experience of 1980-1981 is now a perma
nent feature of the Polish national consciousness. Given
Poland's history ofrebellion-the years 1956, 1968, 1970,
1976, 1980 have become almost a litany-there will prob
ably be trouble again. The underground movement is
biding its time, educating itself, studying the mistakes of
the past, debating long-term strategy, and attempting to
build an "underground society." "'hen the time comes,
this opposition will be a much more organized, disci
plined and potent force than it was in 1980. But it will still
have to deal with Poland's "geopolitical realities" and
decide how to achieve greater measures ofdemocracy and
independence without threatening the leading role of the
party and Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union.
In 1985, most Poles do not want to address such issues
and have turned their attention to family and Church.
The regime has capitalized on the apathy and divisions
within society and the primacy ofmateriaI and economic
concerns. The authorities hope to regain political legiti
macy through economic growth and a gradual improve
ment in the standard ofliving. Given Poland's economic
problems, this is a difficult task. But the authorities must
reckon with the axiom that revolutions occur not when
things are at their worst, when people have neither the
time nor energy for political activity, but when the situa
tion is improving. Like the opposition, the authorities will
also face a dilemma: how to expand political participation
and control it without provoking a revolution.
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